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As spaceflight durations have increased over the last four 
decades, the effects of microgravity on the human body have 
become far better understood, as have the exercise 
countermeasures.   Through use of a combination of aerobic and 
resistive exercise devices, today’s astronauts and cosmonauts 
are able to partially counter the losses in muscle strength, 
aerobic fitness, and bone strength that otherwise might occur 
during their missions on the International Space Station (ISS).  
Since 2000, the ISS has employed a variety of exercise 
equipment used as countermeasures to these risks.  Providing 
reliable and available exercise systems has presented significant 
challenges due to the unique environment.  In solving these, 
lessons have been learned that can inform development of 
future systems.   
 INTRODUCTION 
Long duration spaceflight has a negative effect on the 
human body, and exercise countermeasures are used on-orbit to 
minimize bone and muscle loss, combatting these effects.  
Given the importance of these hardware systems to the health 
of the crew, this equipment must maintain high availability.  
Designing spaceflight exercise hardware to meet high reliability 
and availability standards has proven to be challenging since 
crewmembers have been living on ISS, beginning in 2000.  
Furthermore, restoring operational capability after a failure is 
clearly time-critical, but can be problematic given the 
challenges of troubleshooting the problem from 220 miles 
away.   
Several best-practices have been leveraged in seeking to 
maximize availability of these exercise systems,  including 
designing for robustness, implementing diagnostic 
instrumentation, relying on user feedback, and providing ample 
maintenance and sparing.  These factors have enhanced the 
reliability of hardware systems, and therefore have contributed 
to keeping the crewmembers healthy upon return to Earth.  This 
paper will review the failure history for three countermeasure 
systems with the intent of identifying lessons learned that can 
help improve future systems.  Specifically, the Treadmill with 
Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (TVIS), Cycle 
Ergometer with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System 
(CEVIS), and the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (ARED) 
will be reviewed and analyzed, and conclusions identified in 
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hopes of improving future exercise hardware designs. These 
lessons learned, paired with thorough testing, offer a path 
towards reduced system down-time.  
 COUNTERMEASURES SYSTEMS (CMS) OVERVIEW 
When placed in a microgravity environment the human 
body begins to experience several changes. Among these are a 
loss of bone, muscle mass, and aerobic capacity due to the much 
lighter than typical loads seen by the structure of the body when 
compared to life on Earth. For a healthy individual in space for 
a short period of time these losses are typically significant and 
are quickly remedied upon return to the ground. However, for 
crewmembers that remain on-orbit for an extended period of 
time, the cumulative loss of bone, muscle, and aerobic capacity 
can potentially result in serious negative health effects. These 
effects can include an increased risk of kidney stones due to 
secreted calcium from bones, a loss of ability to tolerate Soyuz 
landing, a loss of ability to perform Extravehicular Activities 
(EVA), an increased risk of bone fracture and osteoporosis 
upon return to Earth, a loss of ability to perform rapid safing 
and emergency egress activities, and a significant increase in 
the amount of time required to complete rehabilitation after 
returning to the ground.  
 
A. TVIS   
The TVIS system was first deployed in 2000 and provided 
aerobic conditioning by simulating Earth’s gravitational force 
(1-g) running and walking on a treadmill in the microgravity 
environment of the ISS. With appropriate loading, treadmill 
exercise also provided impact forces and helped maintain 
neuromuscular and postural mechanisms.   
The Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (VIS) System 
minimized the transfer of dynamic forces caused by treadmill 
exercise to the structure of the Russian Service Module (SM) 
and other parts of the ISS, while at the same time maintaining a 
stable running/walking surface. The VIS components were 
software controlled and worked in unison to counteract the 
imparted pitch and roll torques and to provide a flexible 
mechanical connection to the ISS by stabilizing TVIS against 
excessive motion caused by exercise. The active components of 
the VIS System were the gyroscope, four linear slide-mass 
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stabilizers, four motor controllers and a VIS controller. The 
running surface of the treadmill was used in much the same way 
as any conventional terrestrial treadmill, except the user was 
held to its surface by the Series Bungee System (SBS) and/or 
the Subject Load Device (SLD), which each attached to the 
Treadmill Harness to counter the microgravity environment. 
TVIS served on ISS until 2013, at which time it was replaced 
with the Russian BD-2 treadmill. Figure 1 shows a schematic 
of the TVIS, while Figure 2 shows the TVIS in use on ISS, 
including the SBS. [1] 
 
 
Figure 1. TVIS System  
 
 
Figure 2. TVIS in use on ISS 
B. CEVIS   
While the TVIS provides the ability to run and walk in 
microgravity, the CEVIS system provides cycling aerobic 
exercise, in either a recumbent or upright posture.  CEVIS is 
also used for pre-breathe operations prior to an EVA, periodic 
fitness evaluations, and pre-landing fitness evaluations. The 
CEVIS Ergometer can be controlled electronically via protocols 
in a control panel, or it can be manually controlled by the 
subject.  The Control Panel displays real-time subject data, 
including heart rate, speed, and workload.  Two Inertial 
Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (IVIS) Boxes are attached 
at either end of the Ergometer and provide passive mechanical 
counter-inertia to the forces imparted by the riding subject. 
These minimize forces imparted into the CEVIS frame and 
hence into the ISS structure. CEVIS was deployed on ISS in 
March 2001 and continues in service currently.   Figures 3 and 
4 show the CEVIS schematic and the CEVIS in use in an 
recumbent posture, respectively. [2]   
 
 
Figure 3. CEVIS System 
 
Figure 4. CEVIS in use on ISS 
C. ARED  
The ARED is the primary resistive exercise device on ISS 
utilizing two vacuum cylinders to provide workload. The 
ARED system incorporates multiple improvements to its 
predecessor, the Interim Resistive Exercise Device, including 
increased load from 320 to 600 pounds, a more desirable load 
characterization, vibration isolation, lower maintenance 
requirements, and greater ease of use and reliability. It provides 
bar and cable (rope) exercises, much like ground gym 
equipment, and it contains an inertial flywheel system to 
simulate the feel of 1-g free-weights. ARED was deployed in 
January 2009 and continues in service currently.   Figure 7 
shows the ARED in use on ISS. [3] 
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Figure 5. ARED in use on ISS 
 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS FOR RELIABILITY & 
ROBUSTNESS TERMINOLOGY 
The following definitions and references are provided to 
provide a context for the reliability discussions that follow.   
Table 1.  R&M Definitions  
Term Definition 
Reliability Probability that a given item will perform its 
intended function with no failures for a given 
period of time under a given set of conditions [4] 
 
Availability Probability that an item will perform its intended 
function at a given time, under designated 
operating conditions, and with a designated 
support environment [5] 
 
Risk The combination of the probability that a 
program or project will experience an undesired 
event (some examples include a cost overrun, 
schedule slippage, safety mishap, health 
problem, malicious activities, environmental 
impact, or failure to achieve a needed scientific 
or technological breakthrough or mission 
success criteria) and the consequences, impact, 
or severity of the undesired event, were it to 
occur. Both the probability and consequences 
may have associated uncertainties. [6]   
 
 
Designing for reliability does not only occur in the design 
phase of a project, but it starts during requirements definition 
and continues into the operational phase.   Figure 6 depicts the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
system development life cycle model, and Table 2 lists areas 
and approaches for addressing reliability during various life 
cycle phases.   
 
Figure 6. NASA Life Cycle Phases 
 
Table 2. Reliability Concepts [7] 
Phase R&M Activity 
Concept of 
Operations 
(CONOPS) 
Definition 
 Define maintenance concept  
 Defines reliability needs 
System 
Requirement
s Definition 
 
 Provide the basis for establishing reliability 
and maintenance (R&M) performance 
requirements 
 Risk and reliability analyses help designers 
understand the interrelationships of 
requirements, constraints, and resources 
Analysis   Event sequence diagrams/event trees  
 Failure Modes and Effects Analyses     
 Qualitative top-down logic models  
 Quantitative logic models (probabilistic risk 
assessment)  
 Reliability block diagrams  
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (  
 Human reliability analysis  
 Probabilistic structural analysis  
 Sparing/logistics models  
Design  Zero Failure Design, Fault Tolerance, 
Derating, Durability, Safety Margins  
 Design Reviews  
 Reliability Allocation, Modeling, and Prediction  
 Design Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis  
 Fault Tree Analysis  
 Sneak Circuit Analysis  
 Worst‐Case Analysis  
 Statistical Analysis  
 Quality Function Deployment 
 Robust Design 
 Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery 
(FDIR) Capability 
 Environmental and stress testing, burn-in 
Manufacture  Process Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis  
 Statistical Process Control 
Testing  R&M Performance Requirements Verification 
 Reliability testing (Typical testing regime for 
ISS flight hardware [8]  
 Functional/Integration tests 
 Burn in, Vibration, Thermal Cycle, Pressure, 
Radiation, EMI, Human Factors 
 Stress, Thermal, Materials Analysis 
 EEE Parts and Derating Analyses 
Operations  Failure Reporting, Analysis, And Corrective 
Action System  
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 RELIABILITY HISTORY 
In order to discuss the reliability of each system, this paper 
will address the following areas: 
1. Performance History 
2. Failure History 
3. Success Stories – Reliable Components 
 
Although the focus of this paper is the failures and the 
resulting lessons learned, it is important to note that all three 
systems maintained very high availability rates over their 
lifetimes, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  CMS Operational Availability 
System Availability 
ARED >98% 
TVIS 96.8% 
CEVIS >99% 
A. ARED  
1. Performance History 
ARED has a history of being a very reliable piece of 
equipment, especially given the usage rates on ISS, and even 
the major failures have typically deferred exercise only one or 
two days at most.   
There are only a select few types of failures that will take 
ARED to a NO-GO state, as seen in Table 4 below.  ARED 
exercise in any form would not be able to be performed until 
the broken part is replaced. 
On the other hand, certain types of historical failures have 
been quickly recoverable, and the only factor that would delay 
ARED exercise would be the available crew time to perform the 
replacement or workaround activity.   
Table 4  NO-GO and Failures with Operational 
Restrictions - ARED 
NO-GO Failures 
Failures with Operational 
Restrictions 
 Structural, Push-in-Place 
(PIP) Pin, or Bearing 
Failure  
 VIS component failure  
 Crank Handle failure 
 
 Upper stop cable – no upper 
stop lifts, i.e. heel raises or 
squats 
 Detent Plates worn – Cannot 
perform bar exercise, cable 
only 
 AIB – No instrumented data  
 
2. Failure History 
This section details the important ARED failures that 
demonstrated lessons learned in reliability. 
a) Crank Handle 
The ARED arm base assembly is the connection point 
between the bar or cable actuated by the crewmember to the 
piston shafts that supply the load. It allows the user to adjust the 
load by turning a crank handle attached to the end of a screw 
assembly. The crank handle serves as the crewmember interface 
to the load adjustment mechanism, and it allows the 
crewmember to select the amount of resistance by adjusting the 
position of the slider (Figure 8). The crank handle requires two 
auto-locking mechanisms to be disabled in order to adjust the 
resistance. First, the crank handle is spring-loaded to prevent 
inadvertent slipping of the crank load adjustment mechanism. 
Second, a trigger mechanism in the handle requires the 
disengagement by the crewmember prior to adjusting the load. 
The assembly consists of a stack of keyed parts that transmit the 
load to the adjustment mechanism (Figure 7) [3]. 
 
Figure 7.  Exploded View of ARED Crank Handle Internal 
Mechanism 
 
 
Figure 8. ARED Crank Handle Location 
The first series of ARED crank handle failures occurred at 
approximately 2 years of service in January 2012. Until then, 
no maintenance had been required or performed on it. The crew 
experienced spontaneous increase in dialed load while turning 
the crank handle, which is only possible if something in the 
stack of keyed parts or safety latches were to fail. The crew 
removed the crank handle from the load adjustment unit and 
found that the key that connects adapter 1 to the ball screw shaft 
was sliding into adapter 1 and disengaging the ball screw. This 
was remedied by inserting a small socket into adapter 1 behind 
the key to prevent it from sliding. Next the crew discovered the 
locking pin in the crank handle was worn down to where it 
would not engage the catch reliably. Another successful 
workaround was devised to replace the pin with a bolt. The third 
and final failure on this unit occurred when, again, spontaneous 
load increase occurred. When the crew disassembled the crank 
handle the final time, they found that the keyed interface 
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between adapters 2 and 3 had sheared off, allowing the stack to 
spin freely and bypassing the protective latch mechanism. 
ARED was declared NO GO until a replacement was delivered. 
The socket inside adapter 1 was reapplied to the replacement 
unit and continues to be in use. 
The second crank handle unit had an anomaly occur in July 
2013. The crew reported the handle was loose. Upon inspection 
they determined that the center bolt was loose. The ARED 
engineers developed a procedure to properly tighten the bolt, 
and a routine maintenance activity was added every 6 months 
to prevent the center bolt from loosening again. 
The second crank handle unit remained in service until a 
failure in October 2014. The crew reported a slight spontaneous 
load increase, so troubleshooting was conducted on-orbit. The 
crew found that three of four fasteners that connect adapters 1 
and 3 were completely backed out and free-floating in the 
assembly housing. The crank handle was replaced with a spare 
and returned to the ground for assessment, where it was 
discovered not only had the fasteners backed out, but the keyed 
interface between adapters 2 and 3 was sheared off.  This 
damage can be seen in Figure 9 below.  This last failure initiated 
a change request to redesign the internal parts of the crank 
handle to eliminate possibilities for fasteners becoming loose or 
interfaces from fracturing [9-14]. 
 
 
Figure 9. Adapter 3 Key Damage 
Table 5.  Timeline for Adapter Key 
Date Event 
Jan 2012 Shear key back-out 
Jan 2012 Lock pin failure 
Jan 2012 Adapter failure key sheared off 
Jan 2013 Center bolt loose 
Oct 2014 Adapter screws loose and adapter 
key sheared off 
 
b) Dashpot Failures 
The ARED Vibration Isolation System (VIS) has three major 
components: X-rotation, Y-translation, and Z-translation 
(Figures 12 and 14). After approximately 6 months of use, the 
crew identified damage to X-rotation dashpots, which was not 
previously seen in ground life cycle testing, including a 
separated rod end and cracked glass housing. ARED was 
declared NO GO, and the damaged dashpots were replaced 
approximately a month later after spares arrived on board. It 
was determined that the rod end pulled out of the swage fitting 
and the paddle of the dashpot impacted the loose end, causing 
it to bottom out and crack the glass housing (Figure 13). Three 
subsequent failures occurred over the next 3 years, all 
exhibiting the same failure mode, but spares were pre-
positioned on ISS to provide immediate recovery of operations. 
A design change was initiated on the interface of the rod end 
and swage to provide a stronger connection. This design has 
since been life-cycle tested and certified for flight and has 
proven to survive cycles that equate to the end of the ISS life 
currently set to 2024. Spares will still be flown to minimize risk 
of system down-time [15]. 
 
 
Figure 10. ARED VIS System 
 
Figure 11. -Rotation Dashpot Rod End Failure (left) and 
X-Rotation Dashpot Glass Breakage (right) 
 
Figure 12. X-Rotation Dashpot Position 
c) ARED Instrumentation Board (AIB) Failure 
The ARED instrumentation consists of 14 individual sensors 
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located within the ARED system. The signals produced by 
these sensors are processed by the AIB, which contains filters, 
data acquisition modules, and universal serial bus (USB) hub 
electronics for translation and communication of the sensor 
signals. The AIB outputs the information to the ARED software 
for recording and displaying to the crewmember.  
In August 2011, the crew received an error message 
indicating that the AIB data acquisition board was not 
functioning. It could not be recovered via power cycle, and no 
spares were on board. Ground testing with like units pointed to 
a failure of the commercial USB hub within the AIB. A design 
modification was initiated to make the USB hub replaceable on-
orbit by the crew, and the new design of AIB was certified and 
flown in 2014 [16].  
3. Success Stories – Reliable Components 
Even with the history of failures, ARED has several 
components that have been extremely reliable. The following 
are examples of designing and testing to reach a reliable state. 
a) Polyester Exercise Rope 
The polyester exercise rope experienced an initial failure 
with the splice pulling out during a zero-load condition, but 
since a lock stitch was added to the design, it has operated 
without failure for 2 years on-orbit. This was a significant 
increase in service life over the Vectran exercise rope, which 
required replacement every 6-8 weeks. The success of the 
polyester rope can be attributed to thorough life-cycle testing, a 
scatter factor of 2, and involvement with industry rope experts 
in the design. 
b) Cable Arm Ropes 
Although the ARED cable arm ropes have to be replaced 
approximately every 3-4 months, they have never experienced 
an on-orbit failure, and they continue to fail in a consistent 
fashion during life-cycle testing where they are used almost 
constantly in the ARED life-cycle test rig. Success and 
consistency in the design can be attributed to thorough life-
cycle testing, a scatter factor of 2, and involvement with 
industry rope experts in the design. 
c) Structural 
ARED structure has never experienced a failure to date, 
which can be attributed to materials selection and thorough 
analysis to show positive margins of safety on structural 
components. 
B. TVIS 
1. Performance History 
Compared to other CMS hardware systems, TVIS spent a 
considerable amount of time on-orbit in a NO-GO 
configuration with components/orbital replacement units 
(ORUs) broken and waiting for replacement parts. Life-cycle 
testing was not performed on the original TVIS components, so 
when a part failed, there were typically no spares on-obit, and 
many of the failures required a redesign to fix the problem. A 
large contributor to down-time was that the U.S. was dependent 
solely on Russian cargo flights from 2003-2005 while the Space 
Shuttle Columbia accident investigation was underway. This 
created a longer waiting period for parts to arrive on ISS 
because TVIS was designed for replacement of large ORUs that 
could not be accommodated in the limited stowage available on 
Russian Progress vehicles.  
Most ORU failures that occurred on TVIS took it to a 
NO-GO state, as seen in Table 6 below. TVIS exercise in any 
form would not be able to be performed until the broken part 
was replaced. Certain types of historical failures were quickly 
recoverable, and the only factor that would delay TVIS exercise 
would be the available crew time to perform the replacement or 
workaround activity.  
Table 6  NO-GO and Failures with Operational 
Restrictions - TVIS 
NO-GO Failures 
Failures with Operational 
Restrictions 
 Chassis - Belt/Slat failure 
 Gyroscope or Stabilizer 
failure 
 Control Panel / EB – 
stabilization goes down 
 Drivetrain - Motor box 
(lockup NO GO – spun 
freely – passive mode), 
transfer case, flywheel 
case 
 Roller Bearing failures – 
roller could be removed 
and resume  
 SLD – use SBS instead  
 PC Card – Active (no 
data)/Manual/Passive mode 
workaround 
 
2. Failure History 
This section details the important TVIS failures that 
demonstrated lessons learned in reliability. 
a) Chassis 
The treadmill chassis (Figure 15) consisted primarily of a 
four-sided rectangular aluminum box with two long side panels 
and two end panels. The internal chassis support assembly 
(ICSA) as seen in Figure 16, the main subassembly of the 
chassis, contained 50 roller assemblies mounted in two 
aluminum channels that provided support to the tread belt and 
absorbed the footfall force. Eight roller assemblies were 
mounted to the three cross support beams, which along with an 
additional four black side roller assemblies mounted in the side 
panels, provided support to the tread belt [1]. 
 
 
Figure 13. Treadmill Assembly (Chassis) 
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Figure 14. ICSA Diagram 
 
The running surface of the treadmill, the tread belt assembly, 
was composed of several subassemblies, which included the 
endless belt, slat assembly, pan-head screws, and weld nuts. 
The tread belt assembly consisted of a flexible belt with 159 
individual rigid slats, which were attached to the upper 
Neoprene rubber side of the belt (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 15. Tread Belt Stack-up Nominal Configuration 
1) Broken Tread Slats 
In March 2001, the crew reported that some Ultem 2000 slats 
on the TVIS chassis had cracked during use (Figures 18 and 
19). Pictures were sent to the ground for evaluation, and TVIS 
was declared NO GO for use. Upon evaluation, engineers on 
the ground determined that the slat design had negative margins 
of safety for stress and fatigue. The slats were subsequently 
redesigned and machined from aluminum (Figure 20). The 
aluminum slats were certified, flown and installed, and never 
experienced this failure again in the lifetime of TVIS operations 
[17]. 
 
 
Figure 16.  TVIS Chassis on ISS 
 
Figure 17. Broken Ultem 2000 TVIS Slats 
 
 
Figure 18. TVIS with New Aluminum Slats 
2) Chassis Rollers and Bearings 
First, during post-flight visual inspection of the chassis in 
July 2002, an egg-shaped hole was found in the truss where a 
roller shaft mounts (Figure 21). On-orbit troubleshooting 
revealed two similar holes in the truss on-orbit. The root cause 
of the damage was determined to be a failed bearing that seized 
on its shaft. When the bearing failed, it caused the shaft to begin 
spinning within its mounting hole. The steel shaft began to eat 
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away at the aluminum truss and created the egg-shaped hole. 
The failed bearings were sent to the NASA Materials and 
Processes (M&P) group for analysis, and they determined that 
the bearings had insufficient lubrication and were underrated 
for this application. 
Second, the crew reported a failure with the chassis rollers in 
October 2007. The ICSA with the missing roller can be seen in 
Figure 22 below.  They had approximately 660 hours of use 
(2 years) at the point of failure, but were certified by analysis to 
a limited life of 2000 hours. That analysis was based on KC-135 
test flight data that demonstrated the loads observed at the 
rollers within the treadmill. Using that data in an analysis, the 
center 10 rollers on each side of the chassis would need to be 
replaced every 500 hours, whereas the remaining rollers should 
last 2000 hours. Since a roller outside the center 10 rollers failed 
on-orbit after 660 hours, it was concluded that the analysis 
assumptions were incorrect, and the design did not have enough 
margin to accommodate the actual loads applied on-orbit. A 
design change was made to the roller material and larger 
bearing in 2009 using a modified skateboard wheel, and the 
design proved to be robust, never failing or needing 
replacement. The limited life was set to 500 hours, the same as 
the previous black roller design since no testing was done. The 
performance of the new design was trended and monitored, but 
no damage or significant wear was ever observed, as seen in 
Figure 23 below, so the life was extended to 1000 hours, and it 
continued in use without a failure until the TVIS retirement in 
2013 [18]. 
 
 
Figure 19. ICSA Damaged due to Seized Bearing 
  
 
Figure 20. Roller Damage 
After the following corrective measures (design changes and 
procedure changes) were implemented with the new roller 
assembly design used in the -309 chassis, this anomaly did not 
reoccur:  
 The ICSA was redesigned to eliminate lightening pockets 
and to use a stronger material (Aluminum 7075). 
 D-shaped aluminum bushings on the outboard side were 
added to increase the load-bearing capacity of the truss as 
the shape prevents the rotation of the bushing. 
 The new truss was designed to allow for on-orbit roller 
bearing replacement of the bearings that see the greatest 
load on-orbit. 
 The steel bearing shaft was secured to a locking nut. 
 Rheolube 2000 was used as a bearing lubricant. 
 Crew procedures were modified to regularly inspect for 
failed bearings [19]. 
 Treadmill usage was closely tracked and roller assemblies 
were replaced prior to bearings reaching end of life. 
 
 
Figure 21. New Roller  
 
b) Stabilizer Springs 
The four stabilizer assemblies were used to stabilize Z-axis 
and pitch motion of the TVIS System. The stabilizer assemblies 
were installed onto the treadmill via two captive bolts at each 
of the four corners of the treadmill chassis. The three main 
subassemblies of the stabilizer assembly were the motor 
controller, clamp rope assembly, and the stabilizer (Figures 24 
and 25) [1]. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Stabilizer Assembly 
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Figure 23. Stabilizer and Clamp Rope Assembly 
 
 
Figure 24. Stabilizer – Cover Removed 
  
The stabilizer was comprised of an aluminum housing, rare 
earth magnets with a stainless steel back plate, and stainless 
steel bearings. The stabilizers had an actively controlled mass 
spring motor system with a natural frequency near the average 
running frequency (~3.3 Hz). The stabilizers contained a 
brushless DC linear motor equipped with linear bearings 
lubricated with Braycote 601, which moved the mass-spring 
system to provide an equal and opposite force to the footfall 
forces and to help stabilize above the natural frequency. The 
internal components of the TVIS stabilizer can be seen in 
Figure 26 above. The motor controllers contained all of the 
electronics that controlled the motor movement within the 
stabilizers.  
In May 2009, the crew reported that the TVIS System was 
making a “clunking” noise in the forward right corner at speeds 
of 5-6 mph and that the noise corresponded with each footfall 
while exercising. Troubleshooting determined that the 
“clunking” noise originated from the forward right stabilizer. 
After pinning the throw mass to prevent movement, a visual 
inspection revealed a free-floating spring/flange connector 
inside the stabilizer cavity.  A manned activation and checkout 
(ACO) activity was conducted, and a review of the data and 
video identified unexpected vibrations in the chassis, 
degradation of the chassis stability, and a “thumping” noise 
(indicative of the throw mass within the remaining three 
powered stabilizers being overdriven), thus increasing the risk 
of mechanical damage occurring to the remaining three active 
stabilizers.  
On June 5, 2009 the forward and aft right stabilizers were 
disconnected from the TVIS System by the ISS crew, and their 
covers were removed. Internal inspections of the forward right 
stabilizer revealed that one of the four springs had failed and 
the spring/flange connector fasteners that attached the spring to 
the throw mass had also failed (Figure 27). The spring/flange 
connector fastener heads and spring/flange connector with part 
of the broken spring were removed from the forward right 
stabilizer and the cover was reinstalled. No damage was found 
during internal inspection of the aft right stabilizer. Both 
stabilizers were reinstalled on June 2009, and an ACO 
consisting of a “shake test” for all four stabilizers was 
conducted to identify any additional loose parts within the 
cavities. Following the unmanned and manned ACO, the TVIS 
System was put back into use on-orbit; however, the system was 
in a degraded state until ground spares could be assembled and 
flown.  
In order to prevent additional spring failures and to return the 
TVIS System to a nominal operating configuration, four spare 
springs were flown on flight 2J/A and installed in the forward 
right stabilizer in September 2009. During the April 2010 
Annual Maintenance, a new forward right stabilizer assembly 
was installed and springs were changed-out with flown spares 
in the remaining three stabilizers. Additionally, during the 
scavenge activity on the forward right stabilizer assembly, the 
crew reported an additional failed spring, which was removed 
prior to re-stowing the stabilizer on-orbit as a “scavenge-on-
need” spare unit. Engineering believes that the possible cause 
of the additional failed spring in the stabilizer was due to two 
broken springs identified in the forward left stabilizer during 
the change-out activities. The forward left stabilizer spring 
failures potentially caused the remaining stabilizers to work 
harder (increasing load and spring extension and decreasing the 
natural frequency of the VIS System) and may have contributed 
to the premature failure of the spring in the forward right 
stabilizer [20-22]. 
 
 
Figure 25. Broken TVIS Stabilizer Springs 
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c) Gyroscope 
The gyroscope assembly (Figure 28) was used to stabilize the 
TVIS System from excessive roll during operation and 
provided current peak smoothing of the TVIS System power 
sources. The gyroscope flywheel was housed in an aluminum 
housing. It was designed to spin at approximately 2400 rpm and 
provided the restoring torque to counter roll torque inputs by 
the crewmember. An integral brushless DC motor was used to 
spin the flywheel. Power and speed control for the gyroscope 
was provided from the VIS controller assembly. The gyroscope 
was located beneath the treadmill chassis in an area inaccessible 
to the crew during nominal operations and was attached to the 
chassis side plates. The gyroscope had a vertical spin axis and 
pivot bearings positioned in the pitch direction to allow for the 
required precession during operation. The gyroscope 
incorporated two (one per side) swaged wire rope assemblies 
that aided in restoring the gyroscope back to its neutral position 
and prevent excessive movement [1].  
 
Figure 26. Gyroscope assembly 
 
On November 17, 2003, the crew reported a metal 
scraping/screeching noise coming from the gyroscope. An 
In-Flight Maintenance (IFM) was conducted in December 2003 
to disassemble the gyroscope. The crew identified that the 
bearing was degraded (Figure 29), and an investigation of the 
spare ground gyroscope revealed a similar problem on bearings 
that had only been used approximately 20 hours. NASA M&P 
investigated the problem and determined that the grease inside 
the bearings had been contaminated and was breaking down and 
also that the Nitrile material used to seal the bearing has a shelf 
life of 3 to 5 years. The manufacturer of the bearings initially 
packed the bearings with a hydrocarbon-based grease. The 
instructions in a drawing Flag Note indicated that this grease 
should be removed and the bearings repacked with Braycote 
601 grease, but testing showed that the hydrocarbon-based 
grease was not completely removed on the failed bearings. The 
remnants of this grease chemically reacted with the Braycote 
601, decreasing its effectiveness. This contamination caused the 
bearings to fail prematurely. This information was not 
previously identified by the bearing vendor or found during 
certification of the hardware. The failed bearings were 7-years 
old. It is believed the seals failed, allowing the grease to escape, 
which led to rapid mechanical degradation of the bearings. The 
TVIS System engineering team assembled a gyroscope repair 
kit and an in-depth procedure to allow the crew to disassemble 
the gyroscope and install new bearings. The crew repaired the 
gyroscope in March 2004, and it operated nominally until it was 
replaced by a new gyroscope in December 2006. The newly 
delivered gyroscope included several design improvements. 
The bearing seals were made of Viton, which did not have a 
shelf life. Also, the bearing grease was changed to Rheolube 
2000 [23-24]. 
 
 
Figure 27. Gyroscope Bearing Debris 
 
3. Success Stories – Reliable Components 
Given the schedule and budgetary restrictions on TVIS, the 
ISS Program decided to fly TVIS as a protoflight system and 
essentially conduct life-cycle testing on-orbit. This created an 
evolutionary design process, driven by on-orbit failures. As 
designs failed, were improved, and eventually tested on-orbit, 
they progressed to a good stage of reliability. Some examples 
of items that had initial failures and evolved to reliable 
components include the aluminum tread slats, the redesigned 
chassis rollers, and the gyroscope bearings. These items never 
required replacement once the design was studied and modified. 
The engineering team was able to learn from the failure and 
make the design robust and as fail-safe as possible. 
C. CEVIS 
1. Performance History 
CEVIS has been one of the most reliable devices within the 
CMS system, with failures rarely occurring. Some of this can 
be attributed to the prior experience with the parent design on 
the space shuttle, and some of it can be attributed to parts 
selection, as the parts have proven to be robust. 
Table 77 lists the types of failures that might result in NO-
GO status or failures with operational restrictions.  Failures of 
major components of CEVIS will take it to a NO-GO state, as 
indicated in the following list, but only for a short time, as 
CEVIS has spare parts on board to quickly recover from the 
failures.   
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Table 7.  NO-GO and Failures with Operational 
Restrictions - CEVIS 
NO-GO Failures 
Failures with Operational 
Restrictions 
 IVIS Boxes – NO GO due to 
vibration isolation – first set 
lasted 14 years, passive device, 
no spares 
 Frame piece – no spare, 
workarounds not possible  
 Ergometer – Spares, originally 
no spare  
 Pedal – Spares available 
 Isolators – required for ops, 
spares available 
 Control Panel – CEVIS 
Contingency Controller 
(CCC) available 
 
2. Failure History 
This section will detail the important CEVIS failures that 
demonstrated lessons learned in reliability. 
a) Isolator 
The CEVIS isolators (Figure 30) are wire rope egg-beater-
type devices that provide the only structural attachment 
between the CEVIS frame assembly and the ISS U.S. Lab rack 
using seat track adapters. They contain 12 strands of wire rope, 
and an isolator assembly is attached at each of the four corners 
of the CEVIS frame to minimize the vibrations transmitted from 
the CEVIS System to the ISS structure during operation. They 
are changed out on an as-needed basis when more than 8 wire 
ropes are severed out of 12 on a single isolator. The isolators 
are inspected every 3 months and have had a service life varying 
from 1 to 3 years [2]. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. CEVIS Isolators on ISS 
Over the service life of CEVIS, inspections are conducted 
every 3 months to check the status of the isolators. The wire 
ropes have periodically broken due to fatigue at the clamp point, 
as a stress concentration exists at that point when the wire ropes 
are flexed, but they can remain in service if eight or fewer wires 
are severed. Once the eighth wire breaks, the unit is replaced. 
The crew on Expedition 6 added rolled sock-balls inside the 
wire cage to help reduce movement during the EVA exercise 
pre-breathe activity, which purges the system of nitrogen before 
a spacewalk is conducted. This requires rigorous pedaling and 
movement with the arms, which makes the CEVIS riding very 
unstable without the socks. They also act as bump stops and 
prevent severe bending of the wire ropes.  
The clamp plates of the CEVIS isolator were redesigned in 
2011 to add a chamfer to the edge of the hole where the wire 
rope passes through the plates, thus reducing the stress 
concentration at that point. Figure 32 below shows the outlet 
hole of the isolator before the design change, and Figure 33 
shows the updated design with the chamfered edge. This small 
change has increased service life of the isolators substantially, 
and the true service life is still being evaluated, as only one wire 
has failed on one isolator in almost 4 years of use. Per Figure 
31, it is evident that the effects of the new design (magenta 
lines) are a dramatic improvement [25]. 
 
Figure 29. CEVIS Isolator Performance History 
 
 
Figure 30. Old Design with no Chamfer on Hole Edges 
New 
Design 
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Figure 31. New Design with Chamfer on Hole Edges 
 
b) Control Panel Features 
The CEVIS control panel provides the subject with an 
interface to the control electronics of the ergometer. It stores 
data on a portable storage device and is connected to the ISS 
local area network (LAN). It has a touch screen for crew entry 
[2]. 
Key parameters displayed by the control panel include the 
following:   
 Subject selection  
 Target cycling speed  
 Actual cycling speed  
 Target workload  
 Actual workload  
 Adjusted workload (Rx mode)  
 Target heart rate (Rx mode)  
 Actual heart rate  
 Elapsed time  
 Stage time remaining (Rx mode)  
 Loaded prescription (Rx mode)  
The crew called down in March 2003 that when they tried to 
power up the CEVIS for exercise, they received a “non-system 
disk” error and the control panel would not boot up, even after 
multiple power cycles. The exact cause of this anomaly could 
not be pinpointed while the control panel was still on-orbit, but 
engineering suspected that it was due to either a hard disk 
failure or corrupted software. The crew continued their exercise 
on CEVIS, but in non-powered, manual mode. After 
questioning the crew further, it was confirmed that the crew 
could not get the display to come up at all, the error message 
had been appearing more frequently when the control panel still 
worked, and the modes on the screen were very noisy. Because 
there were no spares on-orbit, engineering concluded that the 
control panel was “failed” and was not recoverable without 
launching a replacement unit. 
A workaround was developed that enabled the crew to 
resume powered CEVIS exercise. Using on-orbit power 
supplies and wire, the crew was able to input voltages to 
regulate the CEVIS workload and receive feedback data via on-
orbit voltmeters. A replacement control panel was launched on 
ULF1.1, and the CCC (Figure 34) was subsequently designed, 
tested, and certified in case another unexpected control panel 
failure occurred. The CCC remains stowed on ISS currently 
[26]. 
 
 
Figure 32. CEVIS Contingency Controller 
 
c) Ergometer 
The ISS cycle ergometer contains the main mechanics and 
electronics to provide the user with cyclic and arm ergometry 
exercises. The ISS ergometer is a modified version of the space 
shuttle IVIS cycle ergometer with the principal difference being 
the addition of an electronic control system. The gear device, 
IVIS interface, frame interface, motor coupling, lever, braking 
band, and manual control systems have all remained unchanged 
from the shuttle IVIS cycle ergometer. The exposed moving 
parts consist of crank arms, pedals, handles, and a clevis fixed 
to a drive rod. The pedals, when rotated, drive a flywheel 
through a planetary gear set. Friction/resistance is applied to the 
flywheel by a braking band that is tightened by a spring-tipped 
ball screw driven by a stepper motor. Feedback from the load 
beam torque sensor enables the stepper motor to maintain a 
constant workload. The pedals also drive the clevis fixed to the 
drive rod of the ergometer. This, in turn, drives the throw 
masses of the IVIS boxes back and forth to counter forces 
applied by the crewmember when pedaling. The ergometer 
houses the main electrical components and supplies the power 
for the control panel. The manual control knob interfaces with 
the ergometer during manual mode operations to manually 
adjust the braking band tension to provide resistance [2].  
During the new CEVIS control panel activation and checkout 
in March 2009, the crew reported seeing the manual control 
knob message appear when the load decreased from a high 
workload to a low workload in protocol mode. A review of the 
new control panel activation and check-out data, PFE and 
subsequent exercise data revealed a gradual increase in 
workloads over time with rest periods not returning to baseline. 
The manual knob function was checked later during ACO and 
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verified to be nominal. Subsequent data analysis showed that 
actual load was not following target workload. When target 
workload changed from high workload levels to low workload 
levels, actual workload was significantly greater than target 
workload. This load discrepancy increased with time over the 
course of an exercise session. On April 9, 2009, troubleshooting 
isolated the problem to the ergometer. The crew was directed to 
stand down on CEVIS operations because load discrepancy 
indicated potential internal ergometer damage, and the risk 
associated with continued nominal usage prior to an ergometer 
internal IFM could result in irreparable hardware damage or 
failure. Trending data analysis from March 29, 2009 to April 8, 
2009 showed the anomaly to worsen over the span of a protocol. 
Several IFM activities were performed in May 2009 to 
disassemble the ergometer. Internal sub-assemblies were 
inspected and determined to be nominal. The braking band, fan, 
guide rod, and flywheel were all cleaned of dust and debris. The 
braking band contained some embedded dirt that was later 
partially removed by brushing and vacuuming. Several internal 
components were inspected and photographed before 
reassembling the ergometer. After the ergometer was 
reassembled, several protocols were run, and the workload drift 
anomaly and manual knob messages disappeared. Data was 
analyzed on a weekly basis, and no major issues were identified 
in the data between June 2009 and middle August 2009. During 
review of the CEVIS data downlinked in early September 2009, 
actual workload data did not return to target load as commanded 
when stepping down from high workload to lower workload. 
On September 15, 2009, the crew noted that ‘Manual Knob 
Activated' message was displayed on the CEVIS control panel 
during a large delta in workload. The direct cause of the 
workload drift was due to the excess friction force from a 
heated, dirty and worn braking band (Figure 34) to the flywheel, 
adding additional mechanical resistance to the system. The 
CEVIS ergometer braking band was replaced with the new 
braking band that was launched on 17A during an IFM activity 
on October 5, 2009 (Figure 35). The braking band had been in 
use on-orbit for approximately 7 years before it was replaced. 
Data processed weekly since October 2009 supports that the 
anomaly had been remedied by replacement of the braking 
band. A braking band limited life of 382 hours was added to the 
Government Certification Acceptance Request (GCAR) and 
began to be tracked by the CEVIS team. It is acceptable to 
exceed the 382 hours if no signs of the anomaly are present [27-
28]. 
 
Figure 33. CEVIS Braking Band Replacement 
 
 
Figure 34. Dirty CEVIS Braking Band 
 
d) Frame 
The mounting frame provides the interface between the 
ergometer and the isolators and can be broken down into eight 
components, which are stowed for launch and assembled on-
orbit. It places the CEVIS System above the face of the rack 
during operations, but allows the ergometer to rotate 90° 
counterclockwise via the mounting block and guide pins to a 
stowed position when not in use. This minimizes the permanent 
protrusion into the ISS LAB aisle and pathway.  The mounting 
block and guide pin are shown in Figures 37 and 38 below [2]. 
In May 2002 the Expedition 2 crew reported that the CEVIS 
was becoming more difficult to rotate into operational 
configuration. They heard a “scraping/crunching” noise, at 
which point they stopped and notified the ground. The crew 
confirmed that the CEVIS was deployed in the operational 
position, not in the stowed position. Engineering determined 
that there was binding in the guide pins causing friction during 
rotation and developed a troubleshooting procedure to help the 
crew assess the problem. The crew verified that the mounting 
block was stuck to the mount pins. Engineering determined that 
the only solution for resolving the issue was replacement of the 
forward frame, guide pins and mounting blocks. Operations 
concluded that this configuration was acceptable since it does 
not impede emergency egress and only slightly impinges on the 
nominal crew translation path. A material analysis was 
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performed on the ground at JSC, which concluded that 
materials selected in this application did not have good 
compatibility for galling prevention. The damaged guide pin 
and mounting block bushing can be seen in Figures 39 and 40 
below. The materials group recommended the use of a 
lubricant, Braycote 601EF, to reduce the risk of galling in the 
future. Before on-orbit implementation, the revised 
configuration with Braycote 601EF was successfully cycle-
tested on the ground the equivalent of 2 years on-orbit use. 
From the time of failure in 2001 until 2006, the crew used 
CEVIS in the deployed position, and it was kept in operational 
position until the new frame was flown on ULF1.1. Yearly 
maintenance to lubricate the guide pins and mounting block 
bushings was implemented in July 2006 and continued every 
year thereafter [29]. 
 
 
Figure 35. CEVIS Mounting Block 
 
 
Figure 36. CEVIS Guide Pin 
 
 
Figure 37.CEVIS Guide Pin 
 
 
Figure 38. CEVIS Bushing and Guide Pin Damage 
  
 
3. Success Stories – Reliable Components 
Given the schedule and budgetary restrictions on CEVIS, the 
ISS Program decided to fly CEVIS as a protoflight system and 
essentially conduct life-cycle testing on-orbit. This created an 
evolutionary design process, driven by on-orbit failures. Even 
with the low rate of failures on CEVIS, as designs failed, were 
improved, and eventually tested on-orbit, they progressed to an 
even better stage of reliability. Some examples of items that had 
initial failures and evolved to reliable components include the 
CEVIS isolators after the outlet chamfer was added to the clamp 
plates and the mounting block and guide pin interface after 
Braycote 601EF grease was added. These items have not 
required replacement since the designs were modified. The 
engineering team was able to learn from the failure and make 
the design robust and as fail-safe as possible. 
 ANALYSIS 
Studying the failure and success examples of the CMS 
hardware systems can assist in the selection of criteria and 
processes that lead to good reliability. Depending on the 
function of the system, it could be a single criterion or a 
combination of many. The following sections detail these 
criteria and processes that can be used in the hardware 
development life cycle to help maximize reliability [5]. 
A. Robustness 
Robustness is an important quality in successful hardware 
and software systems in any spaceflight application. It is 
defined as the degree of tolerance to variations in either the 
components of a system or its environment. It is often defined 
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as the toughness of a system under variable conditions. Items 
that are robust, such as the ARED structure and exercise bar 
hardware system which have never failed, require little to no 
maintenance and are expected to last for the duration of the 
mission without replacement. The robustness of a system 
design can be predetermined on the ground, and confidence in 
a design can be gained via the following techniques: 
1. Life Cycle Testing/Scatter Factor  
Life-cycle testing operates a system under normal conditions 
to determine a service life. NASA uses a scatter factor of 2 for 
non-safety critical items and a scatter factor of 4 for safety 
critical items, which means that for every 2 or 4 cycles in the 
life-cycle test, only one cycle counts towards the actual service 
life on-orbit. This protects the system from variances in 
hardware and conditions to provide ample time for spares to be 
manufactured and delivered to space. It also determines the 
worst-case maintenance interval for replacement. The 
experience with the CMS hardware demonstrated that life-cycle 
testing with scatter factor is a very reliable way to protect 
capability on-orbit and is one of the best ways to predict 
maintenance and resupply schedules so that failures do not 
affect operations or crew health. 
2. Factor of Safety 
The factor of safety is a design margin above the calculated 
ultimate strength or yield of a material. By utilizing a factor of 
safety in an analysis, the engineering team can ensure a design 
is built to sufficient margins so that structural failures are not 
even possible within defined usage conditions. Again, the 
ARED structure is a good example, as it has positive margins 
within all structural components. The structure is classified as 
fail-safe due to these margins, as the process to replace the 
frame and structure on-orbit is not feasible from a budgetary or 
crew time standpoint.  
3. Independence from Functional Instrumentation 
Systems often rely on instrumentation to function, and while 
the data provides valuable insight into the condition of a system, 
electrical systems are often the point of failure for hardware. 
Using the CEVIS and ARED as examples, where 
instrumentation systems failed (CEVIS control panel and 
ARED AIB), the systems were able to continue operations, and 
availability was sustained. The CEVIS could operate in manual 
mode, and the ARED could function without the AIB, as 
crewmembers entered data manually into spreadsheets. This 
independence from the instrumentation systems allowed 
exercise to continue. When designing hardware, this should be 
considered, as these redundancies allow systems to adapt, 
bypass the failure state, and resume operations. 
4. Contingencies/Workarounds 
Contingencies plans and workarounds have been the life-
saver for CMS hardware through the years. A contingency or 
back-up plan can be by design or out of necessity. By design, 
some systems have contingency hardware. For example, 
CEVIS has the CCC in case a control panel fails. By necessity, 
an innovative solution is devised using available supplies as a 
reaction to a failure. An example is tying back the ARED upper 
stop cable with a cable tie when it fails to bypass the failure on 
lower stop exercise. These contingencies allow the hardware to 
remain functional and provide the intended capability to the 
crewmembers. Sometimes a contingency is not possible, but by 
thinking and planning for failures, the response to implement a 
contingency can be relatively short if the required materials are 
available.  
B. Instrumentation  
Predicting failures before they actually happen by careful 
design of instrumentation is key to keeping hardware available 
to crew. Instrumentation provides insight to a system’s 
condition via strategically placed sensors in areas that can 
isolate problems. It often increases the cost of an item, so the 
designer must have solid rationale as to why the data is needed. 
Consideration to power consumption must be taken, as to not 
violate an item’s allotted power footprint. The location, data 
rate, and accuracy of the sensors must also be chosen to provide 
useful trending, warnings, and timely alerts so that a response 
can be applied before an actual failure occurs. Examples of 
useful instrumentation within CMS were the CEVIS braking 
band anomaly and the TVIS Gyroscope bearing failure. By 
having sensors in the right place within the system, the 
engineers were able to analyze data and form a successful 
troubleshooting plan with likely causes. This greatly reduced 
the crew time required to troubleshoot the problem and allowed 
the time to be devoted to actual repairs. 
C. Crew Feedback  
Feedback from crewmembers is a valuable tool in assessing 
the health of CMS hardware. The crew uses the hardware daily, 
so after a short time on-orbit, they become in-tune with how it 
functions and quickly ascertain what is normal from a feel and 
sound standpoint. Crewmembers are trained with the CMS 
hardware for years before their missions. Training allows them 
to become familiar with the operations and maintenance 
activities, and it attempts to normalize how the hardware is used 
and what conditions it experiences with humans in the loop. 
Sometimes the human factor can introduce variations to the 
CONOPS based on an individual’s interpretation of how the 
device should be used, so when planning designs, these off-
nominal conditions should be considered and sufficient margins 
applied. Examples would be the Kevlar TVIS corner ropes 
breaking due to not being strong enough to endure actual on-
orbit running and the ARED Polyester exercise rope splice 
coming apart under zero load conditions as crew handled the 
end of the rope. These could have been prevented had variations 
in the normal operations been considered. Crew feedback can 
also point out failures that were not anticipated, such as the 
more recent ARED upper stop cables. The crew noticed the 
frayed cable and reported the effects, and the ground team 
produced and worked through a fault tree to determine the root 
cause. Without the crew’s observations, the failure would have 
been more sudden and impacts to operations abrupt. By the 
crew giving a warning of the damage, the ground team was able 
to prepare a plan to replace the cable when it failed before the 
actual failure occurred. 
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D. Maintenance and Sparing  
Maintenance and sparing is critical in systems with limited 
life components. Knowing all of the limited life items within a 
system via test or analysis provides an advantage to keeping 
systems operating and increasing reliability and availability. As 
demonstrated in the first few years of TVIS operations, 
unknown limited life on the tread slats, bearings, rollers, 
stabilizer springs, and stabilizer corner wire ropes resulted in 
significant down-time on the system, unexpected resupply of 
spare components, and impacts to crew time to conduct the 
replacement activities. When deep space missions begin, with 
limited stowage volume and mass available for spare parts, 
knowing the life of the system components will be critical to 
mission success. Spares will not be in close proximity, and a 
failure of a part without spares will most likely result in 
permanent NO GO.  
 LESSONS LEARNED 
By studying the failures of CMS hardware, trends were 
identified, leading to lessons learned. First, life-cycle testing the 
hardware before deployment is the only way to accurately 
predict failures and ensure the right number of spare parts are 
stowed on ISS. Using scatter factor, the maintenance schedule 
can help protect against unexpected failures and keep the 
hardware available for use. When a project has funding and 
schedule available prior to flight, they should always life-cycle 
test the hardware to gain this insight. Second, material 
incompatibilities can result in damage to hardware during 
operations, which can lead to failures, as experienced with the 
TVIS gyroscope, TVIS chassis roller bearing, and CEVIS guide 
pin and bushing. When materials are interfaced and experience 
movement, the materials, grease, bearings, etc. should be 
scrutinized by industry experts to ensure the best choices are 
made and reliability is maintained. Third, having ample spare 
parts on board will keep hardware operational and minimize 
downtime. Although this is closely related to life-cycle testing 
and understanding the maintenance interval, for hardware that 
is being flown for the first time, it would be prudent to maintain 
some spares of components that are single-point failures if 
stowage volume and mass limits allow. Good examples are the 
CEVIS control panel and the ARED crank handle, relatively 
small items that could have been flown and stowed with little 
impact and prevented multiple days of NO-GO conditions on 
the hardware. The final lesson learned is that smart, 
strategically placed instrumentation is key to troubleshooting 
problems and quickly recovering from a failure. This will 
become more important as missions venture farther and farther 
from Earth, as replacement hardware, if possible at all, will be 
years away instead of months or days. Most likely, 
replacements will not be available, so a quick diagnosis and 
recovery plan must be formulated and executed by the crew. 
Instrumentation should allow quick isolation of the problem so 
valuable crew time will not be wasted. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
Reliability issues in ISS exercise CMS hardware has 
produced lessons learned as well as success stories. As failures 
occur, they drive designs to evolve and improve to ultimately 
reach a point of utmost reliability. Designers of future systems 
can utilize the resources, examples, and techniques discussed in 
this paper and achieve better success in keeping hardware 
operational for crewmembers. When deep space missions 
begin, system reliability and availability will be more important 
than ever, as failures will have greater consequences. 
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ACRONYMS 
ACO Activation and Checkout 
AIB ARED Instrumentation Box  
ARED  Advanced Resistive Exercise Device 
CCC CEVIS Contingency Controller 
CEVIS Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation 
and Stabilization 
CMS Countermeasures System  
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
EEE Electrical, Electromechanical, and 
Electronic 
EVA Extra-Vehicular Activity 
GCAR Government Certification Acceptance 
Request 
ICSA Internal Chassis Support Assembly 
IFM In Flight Maintenance 
ISS International Space Station 
IVIS Inertial Vibration Isolation and Stabilization 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
M&P Materials and Processes 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NPD NASA Policy Directive 
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit 
PIP Push-in-Place 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
SBS Series Bungee System 
SLD Subject Load Device 
SM Service Module 
SPD  Subject Positioning Device 
SSP Space Station Program 
TVIS Treadmill with Vibration Isolation and 
Stabilization 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
VIS Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (TVIS 
and CEVIS) 
VIS Vibration Isolation System (ARED) 
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